Nearly a century ago, the novelist George Orwell predicted a world dominated by three great powers. Small countries would have to submit to their will or risk devastation. That world did not emerge by 1984, as Orwell speculated it might. Now, however, the idea of splitting the world into three parts is back in fashion.
President Trump is clearly more interested in dealing with Russia and China than with countries that have been traditional American allies, partners, or vassals. A world like the one Orwell described, with three great powers ruling together and others forced to submit or obey, may appeal to him.
Speculation over this possibility has intensified in recent weeks. A commentator in Foreign Affairs concluded that Trump might welcome an accord “that carves up the world.” The New York Times suggested that he was seeking “an arrangement where the United States, China and Russia each dominate their sphere of influence.” Newsweek went so far as to publish a map of how such a world might look. It shows the United States ruling North America, Russia dominating all of Europe as well as its own immense territory, and China governing South Asia from Pakistan to Indonesia.
It’s an idea that could lead to greater stability. Three stern bosses would govern their own regions, slapping down challengers and troublemakers. They would make major decisions together, or at least with respect for one another’s security.
Their rule would also sharply limit the sovereignty of lesser powers that are near one of the three big ones. Canada, Ukraine, and Taiwan would have to follow orders from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing.
Orwell did not invent the idea of dividing vast regions into “spheres of influence” for great powers. It emerged from the Berlin Conference of 1884, at which European powers divided Africa among themselves. Underlying it is the age-old principle that the strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must.
Trump might relish the vision of sitting down to divide the world with two other autocrats, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. It would be a global version of the 1945 Yalta Conference, at which World War II victors decided the fate of European nations. In the modern age, though, it may not be practical.
Nationalism and decolonization have shaped the current generation of leaders in much of the world. That makes it unlikely that smaller countries would now accept guidance from larger ones. Upstarts like Eritrea and Burkina Faso, not to mention middle powers like South Africa and Saudi Arabia, have already shown their willingness to challenge the global titans. Attempts to control them more tightly could lead them to rebel even more forcefully.
Then there is the question of which countries would be the Big Three. In the 1980s, when Russia was tottering and China had not yet reached great-power status, the three forces that came closest to ruling the world were the United States, Japan, and Europe. Today it is clear that the United States and China belong in the top tier. Russia would be the most likely third member. All three of these countries, however, face serious domestic and foreign challenges. They may be top dogs today, but their positions are hardly unassailable. Upheaval in today’s world is in part a result of their inability to control unruly disruptors.
An Asia ruled by India might someday be an alternative to the ruthlessness of the Russian and Chinese regimes. North and South America under Brazilian oversight might be more peaceful and socially just than they are under the wing of the United States. As for Europe, it is in the throes of an epochal identity crisis and no longer projects power as it did in past centuries.
The greatest benefit of a tripartite division of the world is that it might lessen the threat of global destruction through nuclear war. Agreement among powerful nations could calm fears that might propel them toward apocalyptic decisions. Given the urgent reality of this threat, anything that lessens it is instantly appealing.
Obstacles to the three-great-powers vision, though, are easy to identify. Today the United States considers most of the world to be its “sphere of influence.” Drawing new lines would inevitably mean a shrinking of the American domain, something Washington is unlikely to accept. Then there is the question of where those lines would be. Imagining a new world map may be an amusing fantasy project. In real life establishing one would be all but impossible.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to a new division of the world is the highly developed sensitivity of countries that have been victims of imperialism. The United States, Russia, and China were created by seizing land from others. All three have expanded their power at the expense of weaker countries. Those countries, some of them gathered in the BRICS bloc, sense a common threat. Persuading them to accept a return to obedient servitude would require a far better deal than the United States, Russia, or China is prepared to offer.
Stephen Kinzer is a senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.
